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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KEN THURSTON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant
vs.
CACHE COUNTY, et al.
Defendant and
Respondent
Civil No. 16544

MICHAEL P. NIELSEN
Plaintiff and
Appellant
vs.
CACHE COUNTY, et al.
Defendant and
Respondent
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE

These actions, consolidated by the Court because of the
similarity of the facts and law and a common Defendant, were
brought by the Plaintiffs/Appellants in February of 1979.
Plaintiffs' requests for Conditional Use Permits to build
homes on one-acre and five-acre parcels had been denied by

1
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County. · The Complaints asked for Mandamus and Declaratory

.

Relief against the Defendant County, alleging Defendant's
applicable ordinances were invalid and the Plaintiffs were
denied permits because they were not primary-occupation
farmers or related to farmers.

The Defendant answered in

both actions denying, generally, the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaints and affirmatively alleging that the acts
of the Defendants were discretionary and in compliance with
valid County Ordinances.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen,
District Judge, presiding, heard the Plaintiffs' cases on the
7th day of March, 1979.

Both sides presented evidence by

testimony and documentation, and submitted the case to the
Court by written argument and memoranda of law.
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on the 28th day
of March 1979 denying any relief to Plaintiffs, primarily
on the basis that the Court would not substitute its judgment for that of the County Commissioners and on the further
ground that discrimination in favor of farmers was permissible and not unconstitutional.
Thereafter, counsel for Defendant submitted Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Objections to those Findings
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and Conclusions were timely

file~

by Plaintiffs.

On May 21.

1979, the Court issued 'a Memorandum 'Decision denying Plaintiffs' Objections to the Findings on the Grounds that the
Findings had never been presented to the Court.
1979, the Court reviewed the

Findi~gs

On June 26,

of Fact and found no

reason to make any changes.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants request that the Court reverse the Decision
of the lower court and that the relief prayed for by Appellants be granted or that the matter be remanded for further
proceedings, including a decision on Appellants' Request
for Declaratory Relief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to July 1, 1978, Chapter 13 of the Cache County
Zoning Ordinance, relative to agricultural zones, provided
that all parcels would be either A-10 or A-20.

This meant

that in those areas respective parcels could not be subdivided under 10 acres or 20 acres respectively without a rezone
or variance (EX. 1)

Under the old ordinance, a secondary

dwelling on a 10-acre or 20-acre parcel was subject to issuance of a Conditional Use Permit.

3for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Effective July l, 1978, the agricultural zone ordinance
was

chan~ed

such that no Cdnditional

Us~

Permit was required

for persons engaged in agricultural pursuits as a primary
occupation.

Such persons no longer needed a Conditional Use

Permit, but they or members of their family or their hired
help could get a building permit as a matter of course on any
half-acre parcel in the agricultural zone.

All others, who

were not farm related, were required to get a Conditional
Use Permit to put up any dwelling in an agricultural zone.

A point system was inaugurated and a general understanding
existed that a person would need 650 points in order to get a
Conditional Use

Per~it.

(EX. 3a - 3b)

However, in practice,

the point system was only a guideline and some persons were
given Conditional Use Permits though they were below the 650
points and others were denied permils when they had or should
have had more than 650 points.
Under those circumstances, Plaintiffs Thurston and Nielsen
applied for Conditional Use Permits in an agricultural zone.
The facts, as they relate to Thurston and Nielsen, are hereafter separately stated.
THURSTON:
In November of 1978, Plaintiff Thurston attempted to
get a Conditional Use Permit to permit him to build on a

4
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one-acre parcel in an
road in Cache County.

agricultur~l

zone fronting on a county
.
'(TR 18- 19) · His application was

denied and he appealed the decision of the Planning and
Zoning Board to the County Commissioners.
Planning and Zoning Board was
ers by an oral statement.

uphe~d

(TR 20 - 21)

The

by the County Commission-

Nothing in writing was given to

Plaintiff Thurston. (TR 21) At the trial, it appeared that
one of the reasons Thurston's application was turned down
was that he was a builder rather than building a home for
himself. (TR 26 - 27)

Ultimately he was never given any

reason in writing for the County's decision.

(TR 33)

At the trial, Don Williams, a member of the Planning and
Zoning Commission of the Defendant County, testified that the
Commission turned down the application for a Conditional Use
Permit because of objections by adjoining property owners
(TR 38 - 39) and because it did not meet the "point system".
At the meeting, Mr. Williams stated ••••• "if we allow this
request, with it not meeting the point system, then we have
no way to stop further growth".

(TR 39)

(EX. 7)

Mr. Williams also admitted that a Paul J. Wheeler was
granted a building permit on a single acre of ground just two
blocks away from the Thurston property.

The Minutes (EX. 8)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for 5
digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

quote

H~.

Williams as follows:

"Don stated that he is fami-

liar with this site and the ground i's ofl no farm value."
(TR 42)

Mr. Williams admitted that the two parcels both had

about 500 points on the point system and the only difference
is that Mr. Thurston's property had a little grass on it.
(TR 43)

Mr. Williams also admitted that Mr. Call, the land

owner adjacent to Mr. Thurston's property had removed the
top soil from the Thurston property to build the home next
door.

(TR 44)

Mr. Williams also admitted that the Wheeler

property was actually classified as "prime", the same as
Thurston's. (TR 45)

The fact that Wheeler was going to live

in the house rather than build it for someone else was a factor in making the decision, according to Mr. Williams (TR 45)
NIELSEN:
Plaintiff Nielsen requested permission to divide ten (10)
acres he owned into two five-acre parcels for building lots.
The property was zoned agricultural.

His application was

turned down by the Planning Commission and the Commission was
subsequently affirmed on appeal by the County Commission.
The Planning Commission turned down the application on the
primary ground that the request did not meet the point system
due to the fact that it did not front on a county road.

The

land was agriculturally marginal. (TR 49 - 51)
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FACTS APPLYING TO BOTH THURSTON AND NIELSEN:

.

A summary of the iestimony of the witnesses follows.
establishing facts undisputed which apply to both Plaintiffs'
positions.
Don Williams:
Mr. Williams established that whether or not property was
classified prime was of no real importance since, as a matter
of their own judgment, whether or not the members of the Planning and Zoning Commission had looked at the property, they
could re-classify it any way they wanted.

For example, with

reference to the Shaw property, classified on the soil maps as
"prime", at (TR 58) the following appears:

"Bruce stated that

there was a question on the soil, whether it was prime or not.
The county map shows it as prime •••••• Ray made the motion with
Aaron seconding that, in considering the soil type, they designate it as non-prime and that it would meet the point system;
we approved the application".
asked of Mr. Williams:

The following question was then

"So, although the property was shown

on the application as prime, the motion was made to change it
to non-prime so that it would meet the point system at that
time; is that correct?"

Answer:

7

"It looks like it."

(TR 59)
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Donald Drage:
Mr. Drage testified that the Thutstop lot was not classified as prime land according to the county soil survey (TR 65)
and that he sent a letter to the Planning Commission pointing
this out and contending that the 200 point deduction should
not have been considered. (TR 67)
Kenneth Sizemore:
Kenneth Sizemore, an employee of the Planning Commission,
testified that the Planning Office issues_building permits
without ·a Conditional Use Permit when the applicant states
that be is an employee or a member of the family of an
whose primary occupation is farming.

owner

No check is made as to

whether or not that assertion is true except in checking the
name on the deed to the property.

The property need not be

any particular size and it makes no difference whether the
building permit is issued on a small parcel to the son of a
farmer even though the father's farm may be miles away.
(TR 79 - 80)
Hr. Sizemore further testified that it was possible to
get a permit in an agricultural zone without the Conditional
Use Permit by simply showing that there was an earnest money
agreement in existence for the purchase of the property prior

8
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to July 6, 1978, when the new po~nt system and zoning law
went into effect.

I

In at least three instances, building per-

mits were issued without a Conditional Use Permit when earnest
money agreements were produced dated June 30, 1978.
84)

perm~ts

In connection to issuing

(TR 81 -

to farm-related perso•s

without a Conditional Use Permit, Sizemore was asked the
question:

"What do you do to determine whether or not a per-

son is engaged as a primary occupation in dairying or farains
in connection with these applications?"

Answer:

•we ask the

person when they come for the permit."

Question:

•You just

take their word for it?"

Answer:

"Yes, sir." (TR 91)

Mr. Sizemore testified also that there is no restriction on
a farm-related person who gets a secondary dwelling permit
without a Conditional Use Permit against them selling to a
third-party stranger at any time. (TR 94)
Gaylene Carson:
Gaylene Carson, an employee of the Planning and Zoning
Board, testified that both Thurston and Nielsen were turned
down simply because they did not have enough points under the
point system. (TR 129 - 130)
Darrell Kunzler:
Mr. Kunzler testified that he sold a four-acre parcel to
Michael Call who subsequently sold the one acre to Mr. Thurston
(TR 143 -146)

He then appeared and objected to Mr. Thurston's
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9

application for ~ Conditional Use Permit on the ground that he

.

sold four acres to Call for'$2,000.00 an·acre and Call had orally promised not to sell any part of the land. (TR 155) Kunzler
did not object to the Wheeler application, also adjacent to
his property, because Wheeler worked for him. (TR 156)
Joseph Cowley:
Hr. Cowley, a neighbor, testified that he objected to
the Thurston application primarily on the ground that he was
fearful about how people would feel about such things as the
smell of manure and his bulls. (TR 170 - 171)
Hr. Leishman:
Hr. Leishman, a member of the Planning Commission, testified that the Ordinances permitting farmers to get building
permits on agricultural land without Conditional Use Permits
were passed pursuant to a questionnaire that went out to the
entire county.

He testified that all of the residents wanted

Cache Valley to remain primarily as an agricultural valley
(TR 202 - 203)

However, it was established that the question-

naire only received 80 responses. (TR 205) (EX. 24)
Commissioner Theurer:
Commissioner Theurer testified that one of the reasons
why the Thurston permit was denied and the Whee10r permit
granted was that people complained about Thurston's permit
and the only other reason for denial were the reasons given
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in Mr. McKell's letter. (TR 214)

Commissioner Chambers:
Commissioner Chambers testified that, "those who are
related to agriculture have had

t~eirs

(permits) approved and

those who have not been related to agriculture, I think, have
not had theirs approved, generally speaking." (TR 228)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATIONS FOR CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS WAS ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY,
UNREASONABLE, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANCES, EVEN IF VALID,
ARE ADMINISTERED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER.
III
THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS VIOLATED THEIR OWN PROCEDURAL RULES BY NOT SUPPLYING EITHER PLAINTIFF
WITH WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THEIR DECISION,
GIVING REASONS THEREFOR.
IV
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S ORDINANCES, A ONE-HALF
ACRE LOT IN AN AGRICULTURAL ZONE IS UNRESTRICTED.
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v
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANCES ARE CONTRARY TO
THE STATE ENABLING ACT.
VI

BOTH DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT TACITLY ADMITTED
DISCRIMINATION EXISTED AND ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY OR
RATIONALIZE THE DISCRIMINATION.

VII
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

VIII

CONCLUSION
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ARGUMENT
I

THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATIONS FOR CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS WAS ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY,
UNREASONABLE, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Planning and Zoning Board and the Commission both
stated as primary reasons for the denial of the Thruston
permit the opposition of neighbors in the vicinity.

However,

the opposition was not supported by any factual data upon
which the Planning and Zoning Board and County Commission
could validly base a denial of the permit.
"Public notice of a hearing of an application for an
exception to the zoning laws is not given for the purpose of
polling the neighborhood on the question involved, but to
give interested persons an opportunity to present facts from
which the Board may determine whether the particular provision of the ordinance as applied to the applicant's property
is reasonably necessary for the protection of public health.
The Board should base their determination upon facts which
they find to have been established, instead of upon the
wishes of persons who appear for or against the granting of
the application." Sundland vs Zoning Board 50 RI 108, 145a
451 (1929) Anderson American Law of Zoning §19.27.

13
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A use which is permitted by the zoning ordinance may
not be denied on the ground that there is, community pressure against allowing additional uses of the kind proposed.
Fox vs. Buffalo Zoning Board, 401 NYS 2d 649 (1978)
As to Plaintiff Nielsen's property, it was down-graded
on the point system because it did not abut on a county road.
It was established, however, that a right of way existed from
the county road which would not be a maintenance problem to
the County.
The standards by which the Planning Commission, as the
delegated authority, is permitted to grant or deny special
permits are far too vague.

The Planning Commission has

almost unlimited discretion to approve or deny special
permits whether or not they qualify under the point system
which,

in itself, is a very sparse standard.

Where a zoning ordinances permits officials to grant
or refuse permits without the guidance of any standard but
merely according to their own ideas, it does not afford
equal protection of the law.

Osius vs. St. Clair Shores,

344 MICH. 693, 75 NW 2d 25 (1956)
Standards are generally enumerated in the municipal
ordinance in order to control the discretion of zoning
boards of appeals and to provide the judiciary with an adequate basis for judicial review of any board decision.
In the absence of such standards, the court will invalidate
the ordinance.

Rohan,

Zoning and Land Use controls §44.02(1)
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The Defendant County Commissioners have reserved to
themselves as a legislative

bod~

the final power to grant or

deny special permits in Cache County,

Assuming an appropri-

ate enabling statute, the legislative authority may specifically retain authority to issue permits by spelling out such
reservations in the zoning

ordina~ces.

When permit-issuing

authority is retained by the legislative body, the granting
or denying of special permits by that body is regarded by
the courts as an administrative rather than a legislative
function.

When the legislative body is acting in an

administrative capacity, it must follow the zoning regulations and its actions are reviewable and subject to judicial
reversal if they are without support in the record or are
otherwise arbitrary or unreasonable.

Golden vs. St. Louis

Park, 266 MINN. 46, 122 NW 2d 570 (1963) Anderson, American
Law of Zoning, §19.10.
The County's explanation of the point system (EX. 18)
states:

"While it is generally recommended that 650 points

are needed for approval, a use which can earn 650 points is
not automatically approved, although it may be looked on more
favorably than a use which earns less than 650 points."

In

practical usage, however, the point system means almost
nothing other

than its use as an excuse for arbitrary action

for other reasons.

It was clearly established at the trial

that a farm oriented application for a Conditional Use Permit
with less than 650 points would be approved, while a non-farm
oriented application would be disapproved,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology15
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The power to grant or withhold special permits must be
limited by standards sufficjent to conta~n the discretion of
the board of adjustments or other reviewing board and provide
the court with a reasonable basis for judicial review of
board decisions.

Tandem Holding Corp. vs. Board of Zoning

Appeals, 43 NY 2d 801, 373 NE 2d 282 (1977)
The only rational standard the Defendant County imposed
was the point system and they compromised even that standard
by considering it only a general guideline which they could
ignore for reasons of their own.

Thurston showed that his

land was not prime and that he therefore exceeded the required
650 points.

Nothing was introduced by the Defendant to show

that Mr. Don Drage's letter was in error.

Therefore, Thurs-

ton was entitled as a matter of right to his Conditional Use
Permit.

"Where an applicant for a special permit has met all

of the standards imposed by the ordinance for such issuance,
it is the duty of the issuing authority to approve the permit."
Pleasant Valley Home Construction vs. Van Wagner, 53 AD 2d
863, 385 NYS 2d 253 (1976).
It was established at the trial that persons not related
to or working for a primary-occupation farmer or dairyman were
discriminated against in that they must get a Conditional Use
Permit whereas a farmer need not.

It is submitted that these

provisions are invalid as being unconstitutional in that they
deny equal protection of the law.

16

State law requires that
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zoning regulations shall be uniform.

UCA §17-27-11.

This has

been held to mean that'the delegation of power to grant a
special permit must apply a single rule equally to all property
and all property owners in the district to which it applies.
Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 19.05
In the application of equal protection, it has generally been held that the restrictions or standards must apply
to the land itself and not the person nor the business of
the person who owns or occupies it. · Olevson vs. Zoning Board
7l'RI 303, 44A 2d 720 (1945)
Most ordinances today provide adequate and substantial
standards to guide the board's discretion in issuing or denying special permits.

The uniformity requirement, therefore,

appears to be satisfied if the delegation of authority to
issue special permits applies equally to all land owners in
the same zone.

Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls §44.01(4)

On its face, then, the Cache County Ordinance is
invalid inasmuch as it provides that a primary-occupation
farmer or his family and employees may obtain building
permits for residences on his agricultural property whereas
others may not.

Thus, concievably, a farmer could get 15 - 20

building permits for residences on his farm property or for
his family on lots even far from his farm property.

Others
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who own land in an agricultural zone, regardless of the
size, who are engaged in anQther primary· business or occupation, could get no such permit.
The Courts have repeatedly said that the board should be
interested only in the land in question and not the person
who occupies it.

To deny a special use or conditional use

permit because of the occupation or the non-rural tendencies
of the person who owns the land is a denial of equal protection.

Beckish vs. Planning and Zoning, 162 CONN. 11, 291 A

2d 208 (1971) Hickerson vs. Flannery, 42 TENN. APP. 329, 302

sw

2d 508 (1956)
The zoning ordinance clearly permits primary=occupation

farmers to build one-family dwellings without number provided
they are for family members of employees, on their property
on one-half acre parcels.

The ordinance also states that

others must get a conditional use permit.

Thus, if the ordi-

nance is interpreted not to discriminate against persons
because of their occupation, then it is ambiguous.

"If a

zoning ordinance is ambiguous, one section permitting a proposed use anrl another section prohibiting such use without
a special permit, the ordinance will be strictly construed in
favor of the landowner.

Henderson vs. Zoning Appeals Board,

328 SO. 2d. 175 (1975, LA APP) 331 SO. 2d, 474.
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II

THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANC'ES, EVEN IF VALID,
ARE ADMINISTERED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER.
Even if the County Ordinances enacted to become effective in July, 1978, are constitutional, they are, nevertheless, administered in an unconstitutional manner.

Defendants

and their employees seem to disregard the point system which
is really the only objective standard Defendants could follow in granting or denying building permits in agricultural
zdnes.

Planning Commission employees are not determining

definitely that family members and employees of land owners
who may get building permits are related to a primary-occupation farmer or dairyman.

No check is made of that assertion

even though many of the permits are issued on very small parcels.

The conduct of the Defendant in granting or denying

permits does not comply with their policy plan. (EX. 2)
This plan clearly states, as to agricultural land use, that
the purpose of the Commissioners is to promote an agricultural
industry that efficiently produces and markets high quality
food and fibre; is profitable to farm operators; and contributes a high income flow to the local economy.

It has no-

where been shown by the County that denying permits on small
non-economic agriculturally zoned parcels could possibly accomplish that objective.
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The Constitution not only forbids discriminatory laws

.

making distinction without a rational

~asis,

but it also

forbids the discriminatory enforcement of nondiscriminatory
laws.

People vs. Utica Drug Co. 225 NYS 2d 128; 4 ALR 3d

393
III
THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS VIOLATED THEIR OWN PROCEDURAL RULES BY NOT SUPPLYING EITHER PLAINTIFF
WITH WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THEIR DECISION
GIVING REASONS THEREFOR.
§7-2(6) of the County Ordinance (EX. l) provides that, in
connection with appeals to the Commission from decisions of
the Planning and Zoning commission, the Board of Commissioners
may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Planning
Commission.

However, the Board of Commissioners shall pre-

sent, in writing, the reasons for its action.

In the case of

Plaintiff Thurston, no written decision at all was ever given
to him.

In the case of Plaintiff Nielsen, a written decision

was given to him, but no reasons therefor were given.

Fur-

ther, at the Planning and Zoning meeting, Nielsen was asked
why he even hothered to come.
Commission stated:
farmer".

"All you've

An unidentified member of the
~ot

to do is say you're a

(TR 113)

20
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IV
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S ORDINAN~ES, A ONE-HALF
ACRE LOT IN AN AGRICULTURAL ZONE IS UNRESTRICTED.
Exhibit 19 (Defendant's explanation of the effects of the
new agricultural zone) clearly states that "all existing land
parcels, except for restricted loti, will still be eligible
for one building permit for a single dwelling after the amendment is adopted".

§1-6 (79) of the County Ordinance defines

a restricted lot as "a parcel of land severed or placed in a
separate ownership after August 20, 1970, and which does not
meet all area, width, yard, and other requirements of this
ordinance for a lot •••. "

It is significant that the defini-

tion of a restricted lot was not changed, although the area
requirement for lots was changed to one-half (1/2) acre from
ten (10) acres or twenty (20) acres.

Thus it is submitted

that, since a restricted lot has to be one which was severed
after August 20, 1970, and which does not meet area requirements, that any lot whether or not severed after August 20,
1970, is not a restricted lot if it is one-half acre or larger.
(County Ordinance §13-5)
It follows that since the point system and the conditional
use requirement applies only to restricted lots that, as a matter of logic, the County Ordinances cannot apply to lots onehalf acre or more in an agricultural zone.
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v
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANCES ARE CONTRARY
TO THE STATE ENABLING ACT.
Any power the Defendant Commission has to enact zoning
ordinances and issue special permits is granted by enabling
legislation in the Utah Code §17-27-1 et. seq.

A careful

analysis of the enabling legislation does not reveal any
authority of the County Commission to reserve to itself the
power to issue or deny special permits.

On the contrary, the

County Commissioners are mandated to create a Board of Adjustment.

The Board of Adjustment by state law is to handle all

"appeals •••• taken by any person agrieved by his inability to
obtain a building permit or by the decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon or made in the course of
the administration or enforcement of the provisions of the
zoning resolution".

UCA §17-27-15; §17-27-16.

"The customary method of providing for the issuance of
special permits is for the legislative authority of a municipality to delegate issuing power to a Board of Adjustment
subject to standards srelled out in the regulations.

Where

such a delegation of power is made, the legislative authority is without power to issue special permits.

Depue vs.

Clinton, 160 NW 2d, 860 (1968).
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"In the absence of some provision in the enabling statutes for the issuance of

permit~

by the legislative body,

'

or some specific retention of this power in the zoning ordinance, a municipal legislative authority is without power to
grant special permits.
§19.10.

Anderson, American Law of Zoning,

Section 7-2 of the County ·Zoning Ordinance specifi-

cally bypasses the Board of Adjustment on appeals from the
Planning Commission on the issuance or denial of the special
permit.
power.

The Commissioners have reserved to

th~mselves

this

There is a serious question as to whether it is per-

mitted by the state enabling legislation.

VI
BOTH DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT TACITLY ADMITTED
DISCRIMINATION EXISTED AND ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY OR
RATIONALIZE THE DISCRIMINATION.
In Finding of Fact Number 9, the Court found that the
evidence introduced "shows no discrimination against the
Plaintiff on an intentional basis .••. "
In Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum
filed subsequent to the trial, Defendant's counsel stated on
page 2 thereof that, even though the Wheeler and the Thurston
properties were both classified as prime, the Wheeler land was
apparently not of the same quality and, therefore, Wheeler
was granted the permit and Thurston was not.

No evidence

supports such a conclusions.
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In the Court's Memorandum Decision dated the 28th of
March, 1979, the Court tacitly admitted that there was discrimination but attempted to justify or rationalize it the
discrimination by stating that "both Plaintiffs were provided hearings and the opportunity to appear and present
their views •••• "

The granting of procedural due process has

no bearing upon whether or not Plaintiffs were discriminated
against on the basis of substantive due process.

The Court

went on to say that "no situations .:ere presented showing
that Defendant discriminated against either Plaintiff on an
intentional basis".

It is submitted that whether or not

discrimination is intentional is immaterial.
As to the obvious advantage of farmers under the present
County Ordinance, the Court attempted to justify by pointing
out that farmers do not pay gas tax for off road gasoline.
The primary reason for that being a bad analogy is that
farmers do not pay gas tax for off-road gasoline because
they don't use the roads and the gas tax is for road building and maintenance.

The classification is off-road vehicles,

not occupation. The Court concludes in its opinion that preference on the use of agricultural land is given to anyone
who desires to use the land for agricultural purposes and
for no other reason.

It ts submit! ed that this is not the

24digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case.

The evidence clearly establishes that one had to be

related to or work fo~ a Primarj-occupation farmer or dairyman.

One otherwise employed could own a thousand acres of

land and, if someor.e else was operating it for him, the
owner's children and employees would not be entitled to
permits under the present County Ordinances without conditional use approval.
In a rather cUrious "confession and avoidance argument",
Defendant, in its trial brief, substantially admitted that
Defendants have discriminated and have denied equal protection of the law.

They attempt to avoid the impact by arguing

that discrimination exists in other areas of life.

Defendant

then argued, in effect, that residents of Cache County could
avoid the discrimination by becoming full time farmers
themselves.

That same specious argument could apply to any

discrimination and the constitutional requirements of equal
protection would be annulled if one were to assume that any
citizen could avoid discrimination by leaving the class
being discriminated against.
VII
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Plaintiffs filed, on April 25, 1979, Objections to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Specifically, Find-

ing Number 4 was objected to on the ground that it assumed
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the validity of the County Ordinances and

assu~ed

also that

the County Policy Plan esta~lished the goals recited in the
Findings.

The uncontradicted evidence was to the contrary.

The Ordinance, on its face, permits discrimination in favor
of primary-occupation farmers and farm oriented persons as
does the testimony of the County Commissioners.
It was also established without contradiction that one
who had insufficient points but who was, nevertheless, "farmoriented" would be granted a Conditional Use Permit.

Plain-

tiffs also asked that Findings Number 7 and Number 8 be
amended on the ground that Plaintiffs' applications were
not denied for the reasons stated.

No adequate reasons for

the denials were given nor was any reason given by the Defendant Commission in writing.
It is further submitted that the other objections mentioned in Plaintiffs' filed objections are valid and that
the Findings should have been amended and supplemented accordingly.

VIII
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the only reason of any substance
for the denial of the Thurston permit was objections by neighbors and the fact that Mr. Thurston wa

26

1

not "farm-oriented".
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It is submitted that these reasons are not constitutionally
valid.

.

Further, the opposition voiced by Thurston's "neigh-

bors" was not supported by any factual data upon which the
Planning and Zoning Board could validly base a denial of a
Conditional Use Permit.
One objection to an ordinance which delegates a broad
special permit authoirty is that it opens the door to discrimination not based upon valid differences.

Smith vs.

Board of Appeal, 319 MASS. 341, 65 NE 2d 547 (1946)
The standards under which the County Defendant operates
are far too vague and far too flexible to provide substantive
or procedural due process. The County has almost unlimited
discretion to approve or deny Conditional Use Permits since
they can pay heed to or disregard their own standards which
consist primarily of the point system.

It is therefore

respectfully submitted that the Judgment should be reversed
and the relief prayed for by Appellants be granted.
DATED this

31st day of August, 1979.

~fllwlil:~
Barrett & Mathews
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants
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